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Comments
Post-Discharge Failure to
Warn: A New Theory Allowing
Access to FTCA Recovery
INTRODUCTION
The decision in Feres v. United States' effectively bars serv-
icemen from bringing claims against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act2 for injuries sustained while on active
duty.3 The interpretation of Feres has proved troublesome for
the courts, especially with regard to recent claims by servicemen's
children. Many of these claims allege genetic damage caused by
their father's exposure to radiation4 or chemical defolients5 while
on active duty.
This Comment examines the Feres doctrine as it has developed
over the past four decades and the theories under which military
plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries sustained while on active
duty. It concludes that the post-service failure to warn theory is
the most viable alternative to the Feres complete bar to recovery.
This theory affords equitable relief to the military plaintiff while
avoiding encroachment on traditional judicial deference to mil-
340 U.S. 135 (1950).
2 Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 101, 60 Stat. 842 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b),
1402(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2412, 2671-2680 (West 1965, 1976, 1978 & Supp. 1986))
[hereinafter FTCA or Act].
340 U.S. at 146. The court concluded that the "Government is not liable under
the Federal Torts Claim Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or
are in the course of activity incident to service." Id.
4 See Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S.Ct. 1272 (1984); Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1210 (1983); Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 989 (1982); Seveney v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 653 (D.R.I. 1982); Hinkie v.
United States, 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd, 715 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984).
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980),
rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1417 (1984).
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itary autonomy in making command decisions and in treatment
of personnel.
I. FERES AND ITS PROGENY
For many years the doctrine of sovereign immunity6 pro-
tected the United States from incurring any liability to its citi-
zens.7 In 1946, Congress8 passed the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA),9 waiving sovereign immunity and extending the time
honored maxim of common law-that for every legal wrong
there is a remedy10-to encompass government committed wrongs.
6 The explanation for the initial acceptance of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in the United States is obscure. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
Justice Marshall stated that because the Judiciary Act did not authorize any suits against
the United States, none could be maintained. Id. at 411-12; In Kawananakoa v. Poly-
blank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), Justice Holmes stated: "A sovereign is exempt from
suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends." Id. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584
(1941).
7 See Gellhorn & Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Claims Against the United
States, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1955) (Since tort remedies could not be obtained in the
courts, claimants resorted to petitioning Congress for relief in the form of private bills.).
I Prior to 1946, all tort claims were handled by members of Congress on behalf
of their constituents. The congressional representative would introduce a private relief
bill, which would then follow the steps of the legislative process until its eventual passage
or defeat. See id.; Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950) (Congress realized
that the private bill procedure was an inadequate vehicle for handling tort claims against
the government.). See also Note, In Support of the Feres Doctrine and a Better Definition
of "Incident to Service," 56 ST. JOHN's L. Ra,. 485, 490 n.38 (1982) (The private bill
procedure was unduly burdensome, unjust and inefficient.).
9 The Act gives district courts:
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States...
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (Vest 1976). See Comment, Military Medical Malpractice: Rem-
edies for the Overseas Dependent, 29 HAsTINGs L.J. 589, 593-95 (1978) (brief discussion
of the procedures required to recover under the FTCA). See generally RESTATEmENT (SEC-
OND) OF ToRTs, §§ 895A-895C (1979).
10 Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. 368, 378, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803). The Court
stated: "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Id. See Waynick
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There are, however, several types of claims exempt from the
scope of the FTCA." Two of these exempt claims directly af-
v. Chicago's Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
903 (1960).
1 Exceptions to the waiver of immunity are delineated in 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (West
1965 & Supp. 1986):
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such a statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a Federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent trans-
mission of letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any
tax or customs duty, or the detention of any good or merchandise by any
officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752,
781-790 of Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United
States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of
the Government in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title 50,
Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment
of a quarantine by the United States.
(g) Repealed. Sept. 26, 1950, c. 1049, § 13(5), 64 Stat. 1043.
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresen-
tation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the
Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system.
() Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military
or naval forces or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority.
(in) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal
Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a
Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives.
In 1974 Congress amended (h) to read:
with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers
of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date
of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of
this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any of-
ficer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to
seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal Law.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (West Supp. 1986).
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fecting military personnel' 2 are claims arising out of a combat-
ant's service during wartime and any claim arising in a foreign
country. 3
Shortly after passage of the FTCA, the government argued
in Brooks v. United States14 that all tort claims of military
personnel should be barred under the FTCA.15 The United States
Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that military
personnel had the right to sue the United States for tortious acts
under the FTCA.' 6 The Court, however, qualified its ruling,
stating that if the accident was "incident to [the soldier's] serv-
ice, a wholly different case would [have been] presented.' 1 7 The
Court noted that this was an accident involving a negligently
operated army truck that struck a privately owned automobile.
The Court, however, expressed no further opinion as to how the
outcome of the case would differ had the accident been incident
to Brooks' service. 8
This different case was presented in Feres v. United States19
and the companion cases decided with it.2° In each of these
cases, servicemen who suffered injuries sought recovery under
the FTCA.2' The United States Supreme Court unanimously held
12 "Employee" is defined under the FTCA to include "members of the military or
naval forces of the United States, members of the National Guard while engaged in train-
ing or duty under section 316, 502, 503, 504 or 505 of title 32. . . ." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671
(West Supp. 1985).
1 28 U.S.C.A. § 26800), (k).
" 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). (Two soldiers were off
the military base and on furlough when an army truck struck their vehicle killing one
soldier and badly injuring the other. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals
and reinstated the trial court's decision.).
1 Id. at 50.
16 Id. at 51 (The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and
reinstated the trial court's decision.).
37 Id.
" Id.
'9 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
2o Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949), aff'd, 340 U.S. 135 (1950);
Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), rev'd sub. nom., Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949),
aff'd sub. nom., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
21 In Feres a serviceman on active duty died when the barracks in which he was
sleeping caught fire. His executrix claimed the barracks were unsafe and therefore the
United States was negligent to quarter men in them. The Griggs and Jefferson cases
involve injuries and death resulting from the alleged negligence of Army surgeons. In
both of these cases, the servicemen were on active duty during the operations.
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the government "not liable under the [FTCA] for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course
of activity incident to service."'
Examining the legislative history of the FTCA, the Feres
Court noted that the Act did not refer specifically to the exclu-
sion of suits by servicemen injured on active duty." The Court,
however, discerned no congressional intent to waive immunity
for active duty suits from the Act's scheme.
24
The Court based this conclusion on several factors.? First,
the "distinctively federal nature" of the relationship between the
government and members of its military was governed tradition-
ally by federal rather than local law. 26 Because the FTCA relies
upon the law of the jurisdiction where the act or omission
occurred, the Court reasoned that fortuitous circumstances should
not control the government's liability. 27 Second, Congress estab-
lished a comprehensive system of relief available to all injured
service personnel and their dependents under the Veterans' Ben-
efit Act, which provides a statutory "no fault" compensation
scheme. A third factor, clarified in United States v. Brown,29
was the potentially adverse effect on military discipline. The
Brown Court emphasized:
[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his
superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on
discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits
under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders
21 340 U.S. at 146. The chief distinction was that in Brooks the soldiers had been
injured by a military vehicle while on furlough, whereas in Feres and its companion cases,
the men were on active duty at the time of their injury. Thus, the United States Supreme
Court distinguished Brooks in that the "injury to Brooks did not arise out of or in the
course of military duty.") Id.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 142-43. But see Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666,
675-76, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 882 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (maintaining that
congressional silence supports the inference of nonexclusivity at least as well as exclu-
sivity).
340 U.S. at 143-45.
Id. at 143.
z, Id. ("That the geography of an injury should select the law to be applied to his
tort claims makes no sense." Id.)
Id. at 144.
348 U.S. 110 (1954).
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given or negligent acts committed in the course of military
duty .... 0
Subsequent decisions weakened the importance of the first two
factors3' and emphasized the third factor32 until the United States
Supreme Court ruling in Stencel Aero Engineering Corporation
v. United States.
33
Deciding whether to apply Feres or Brooks has been difficult
for the lower courts because the United States Supreme Court
never fully defined the term "incident to service."' 34 Despite the
confusion, the Feres decision effectively amended the FTCA to
restrict servicemen's right to sue the federal government 35 and
thus "plunged a large class of potential claimants back into the
era of sovereign infallibility.1
36
Although Feres was criticized by the lower courts37 and legal
scholars, 38 in 1977 the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
30 Id. at 112.
11 See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957) ("Ihe test estab-
lished by the Tort Claims Act for determining the United States' liability is whether a
private person would be responsible for similar negligence under the laws of the state
where the acts occurred."); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955)
(distinguishing Feres v. United States).
11 United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 159 (1963) (declining to extend the Feres
rationale to Federal Penitentiary inmates); United States v. Carroll, 369 F.2d 618 (8th
Cir. 1966) (applying Feres to Reservists).
3 431 U.S. 666, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 882 (1977). The "effect of the action upon
military discipline is identical whether the suit is brought by the soldier directly or by a
third party." Id. at 673.
3 E.g., Hale v. United States, 416 F.2d 355, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1969), on remand,
334 F. Supp. 566 (M.D. Tenn. 1970), aff'd, 452 F.2d 668, 669 (6th Cir. 1971) (dem-
onstrating the confusion caused by the lack of definition for the term "arising out of or
in the course of service").
11 See Note, Malpractice Protection for Military Medical Personnel and the Feres
Doctrine: Constitutional Tension for the Military Plaintiff?, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 525 (1978).
Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA
Recovery?, 77 MicH. L. Rav. 1099, 1099 (1979) [hereinafter Note, From Feres to Stencel].
'7 See 416 F.2d at 360 (The court criticized the vagueness of the Feres standard and
held the proper test was whether the injury "arose out of or in the course of military
duty."); Schwager v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 262, 263 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (The court
suggested "an analysis of the relevant links between the 'activity' and the service."). See
also Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082
(1983) (emphasizing the importance of military discipline); Hunt v. United States, 636
F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the Feres doctrine is not applicable to military
personnel claims under the Swine Flu Act).
Compare Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 RUTGERS
L. REv. 316 (1954) (analyzing the Feres rationale) with Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra
note 36 at 1101 (arguing that the FTCA should be extended to military claims).
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the Feres doctrine in Stencel. The case involved injuries suffered
by Captain John Donham of the Air National Guard when he
was forced to eject from his jet and the egress life-support system
malfunctioned. Donham sued Stencel, manufacturer of the sys-
tem, and the United States. The district court dismissed both
claims against the United States on the basis of Feres.39 Although
Donham did not appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reviewed Stencel's appeal and upheld the district court. 40
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, thus denying
Stencel's indemnity claim from the federal government 4' and
extending the Feres doctrine to bar third party indemnity actions
against the United States for damages paid to cover service
connected injuries.
42
The Court reached its decision only after analyzing the three
factors. 43 As to the first factor, the federal nature of the rela-
tionship between the government and military personnel, the
Stencel Court noted the unique function of the Armed Forces
in protecting the United States and that this requires large groups
of personnel and equipment to be moved across both the nation
and the world.4 The Court reasoned that the relationship be-
tween a soldier and his superiors makes it illogical to "permit
the fortuity of the situs of the alleged negligence to affect the
liability of the Government to a serviceman ... ."45 As was held
in Feres,46 "it [then] makes equally little sense to permit that
situs to affect the Government's liability to a Government con-
tractor for the identical injury. ' 47 Thus, the Stencel court applied
" Donham v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (Stencel cross-claimed
against the United States for indemnity and the district court dismissed both claims against
the United States).
4' Donham v. United States, 536 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1976).
" Stencel cross-claimed against the United States for indemnity. Basing its decision
on Feres, the district court dismissed both claims against the federal government. See
also Donham v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 765
(8th Cir. 1976).
41 431 U.S. at 673.
41 431 U.S. at 670-73. See Nagy v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1979)
(upholding the Feres three-prong rationale for the "incident to service" rule).
" 431 U.S. at 672.
"' Id.
340 U.S. at 143.
4 431 U.S. at 672.
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the first factor of Feres with equal force to third party claimants.
In applying the second factor, the Court found that the
Veterans' Benefit Act serves a dual purpose: to provide compen-
sation to injured soldiers48 and to provide an upper limit of
liability for the Government as to service-connected injuries.
49
Therefore, to grant FTCA recovery where this act limited recov-
ery would frustrate an essential purpose of the Veterans' Benefit
Act.5
0
The Court held the third factor, adverse effects on military
discipline, to be equally applicable to Stencel. The Court stated
that where the case concerns an injury sustained by a soldier
while on duty, the effect of the action upon military discipline
is identical whether the suit is brought by the soldier directly or
by a third party because the trial would still involve "second-
guessing of military orders, and ... require members of the
Armed Services to testify in court as to each other's decisions.''5,
Thus, Stencel extends the Feres bar to third party indemnity
claims. The Court used deference to military automony in mak-
ing command decisions as its rationale.5 2 Military personnel,
therefore, continue to be deprived of recourse through the FTCA.
41 Id. at 673. In a 1948 letter responding to an inquiry regarding the Tort Claims
Act, the Solicitor of the Veterans' Administration was quoted as stating:
... at the time veterans' benefit laws were enacted there was no necessity
for the Congress to exclude military personnel from recoveries under the
Tort Claims Act as that act was not in existence, but throughout the history
of legislation awarding benefits to ex-servicemen, the Congress had exhib-
ited care to avoid duplication of benefits.... [I]n enacting the Tort Claims
Act, the Congress did not in specific terms exclude from coverage under
the said act those entitled to either veterans' benefits or Federal employees'
benefits and that under applicable statutes such benefits would be payable
notwithstanding the claimant may have recovered under the Tort Claims
Act.
Hitch, supra note 38, at 328-29.
49 431 U.S. at 672. See Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 456 U.S. 972 (1982) (The existence of an alternative remedy under the Veterans'
Benefit Act in conjunction with the effect of suits on military effectiveness barred the
suit of a former serviceman and his wife for injuries he sustained as a result of radiation
exposure while on active duty.).
431 U.S. at 672.
11 Id. at 673.
52 See id.
[Vol. 75
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II. EXCEPTION TO FEREs: POST-SERVICE FAILURE TO WARN?
A possible exception to the Feres bar to recovery under the
FTCA53 is the post-service failure to warn theory of negligence.
4
One issue in analyzing a claim under this theory is whether the
alleged post-service negligence is separate and distinct from the
negligent injury sustained while in the military.55
For example, in Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency,5 6 a
former serviceman alleged the United States was negligent in
failing to obtain his informed consent, as well as failing to
debrief and monitor him51 following his participation in a chem-
ical warfare experimentation program.5 8 The Stanley court relied
on Thornwell v. United States,59 which involved a veteran's claim
against the United States for covert administration of LSD dur-
ing his imprisonment while on active duty in the military. 60
Thornwell allowed recovery for the government's negligence in
failing to provide the former serviceman with any follow-up
" See Note, The Nevada Proving Grounds: An Asylum for Sovereign Immunity?,
12 Sw. U.L. REv. 627 (1980-81) (supporting application of this cause of action for cases
brought by ex-servicemen who developed cancer allegedly as a result of their exposure to
radiation during atomic weapons testing in Nevada).
'4 Another cause of action is a suit directly under the Constitution against individual
government defendants for intentional and unintentional torts occurring incident to serv-
ice. See Note, Intramilitary Immunity and Constitutional Torts, 80 MIcH. L. REv. 312
(1981). The conclusion advocates a form of qualified immunity instead of absolute im-
munity for military defendants giving greater flexibility to courts. This would allow main-
tenance of an effective military and also establish greater protection for constitutional
rights. Id. at 333. See also Note, Government Immunity and Liability, 11 SEToN HALL
275 (1980). But see Schmid v. Rumsfeld, 481 F. Supp. 19, 21 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (Feres
doctrine barred claim of former Marine based on failure of superior to provide protec-
tion); Nagy v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 383, 384 (D.D.C. 1979) (former serviceman
could not sue United States for damages arising out of LSD experiments); Thornwell v.
United States, 471 F. Supp. 344, 347-49 (D.D.C. 1979) (United States immune from li-
ability for covert administration of drugs, harassment, interrogation and imprisonment
that left former serviceman a "cripple"). In each of these cases the claims brought directly
under the Constitution were dismissed.
See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954).
639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981).
, Id. at 1149. During the clinical testing program, Stanley was given Lysergic Acid
Diethylamid (LSD) without his knowledge. As a result of government negligence, ap-
pellant claimed he suffered severe physical and mental injuries. Id.
" Id. An Army administered voluntary program was designed to develop and test
methods of defense against chemical warfare.
471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
"Id. at 346-47.
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examinations or treatment after his discharge.6' Whereas Thorn-
well could not recover for the covert administration of the LSD,
he could recover for the failure of the government to follow-up
because this failure was a separate act. 62 This second act was
negligent and had occurred entirely after Thornwell obtained
civilian status, thus making it a valid claim.
63
In Stanley, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reasoned that because Stanley had remained in the Service eleven
years after administration of the LSD, the alleged failure to
warn could not have taken place totally after discharge. 64 The
court concluded:
Stanley has at best alleged two negligent acts, the administra-
tion of the LSD and the negligent failure to monitor his
condition, both of which occurred at least in part during his
time as a serviceman even if they or their effects lingered after
his discharge. Allegations of such "continuing torts" do not
escape application of the Feres doctrine. 6
Therefore, in order for Stanley to escape the Feres doctrine, he
needed to state a separate cause of action for negligent failure
to monitor after he was discharged. 6 To fall within the separate
tort theory of Thornwell, he needed to allege an intentional tort
injuring an active duty serviceman and a negligent failure to
provide follow-up care after discharge from the service.67 Other
courts have given greater consideration to the time at which the
government learned of the danger to the claimant as determi-
native in analyzing post-discharge failure to warn claims.
63
61 Id. at 349-53.
62 Id. at 351.
63 Id. See Hungerford v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (The
court recognized the unnecessary continuation of an early injury.), rev'd on other grounds,
307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962).
639 F.2d at 1154.
65 Id.
m Id.
67 Id.
See Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (allowing re-
covery for failure to warn where dangerous effects of radioactive contrast dye were not
discovered until post-service).
[Vol. 75
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III. RECOGNITION OF POST-SERVICE FAILURE TO WARN THEORY
In Broudy v. United States,69 the spouse of a serviceman
brought an action against the United States government for
negligent failure to warn or monitor injuries her husband sus-
tained as a result of his exposure to radiation while in military
service.70 Whereas the court concluded that a claim against the
government for its decision to expose Broudy to radiation was
barred by Feres, it reasoned that if the appellant could prove an
independent post-service negligent act on the part of the govern-
ment, her claim would be cognizable under the FTCA.71 To
constitute such an act, the government must have learned of the
danger after the serviceman's discharge. 72 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals harshly criticized the government's argument
that, because the duty to warn arose from Broudy's in-service
exposure to radiation, the claim was barred by Feres.73 The court
stated:
The Feres doctrine does not speak to the existence of a duty;
it only precludes claims against the government where the
injury is incident to service. The question of an actionable
duty is an inquiry separate from the application of the Feres
doctrine. Without looking to appropriate state law, the gov-
ernment assumes that no duty can exist independent of Brou-
dy's relationship to the armed services. By collapsing the two
inquiries, the government never reaches the issue of which
state's law governs and whether that state imposes a duty to
warn or monitor.74
The court, therefore, ruled that the claim would receive a hearing
on the merits in district court.
75
" 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part, 722 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1983) (en
banc).
70 661 F.2d at 126. During 1957, Major Broudy was ordered to participate in mil-
itary exercises in the immediate vicinity of two nuclear tests conducted in Nevada. He
was discharged in 1960 and died of cancer in 1977. Id.
n Id. at 128-29.
72 Id. at 129.
11 722 F.2d at 570.
74 Id.
" Id. See Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied
106 S. Ct. 30 (1985). Mr. Molsbergen was exposed to radiation as a result of the atomic
1986-87]
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In neither Broudy nor Molsbergen v. United States 6 did the
Ninth Circuit rely on the three-factor Feres rationale as exem-
plified in Stencel.7 Since the United States Supreme Court as
recently as 197778 reiterated its concern for these factors, no
claim can be successful without first addressing them. The three
issues addressed are: (1) whether the post-failure to warn theory
will upset the federal relationship between the government and
its armed forces; (2) whether the post-failure to warn theory will
ignore the congressional intent behind the Veterans Benefit Act
to have it as the system of no-fault compensation; and (3)
whether the post-service failure to warn theory will alter the
relationship between soldiers and their superiors. By skirting the
three-factor rationale of Stencel, the Ninth Circuit provided no
logical basis for courts to prescribe this theory of negligence is
allowable under the Feres doctrine.
Other district courts found judicial review of military deci-
sions to be a major stumbling block for allowing the post-service
failure to warn claim to go forward. 79 Kelly v. United Stateso
illustrates this point well. Kelly alleged that he developed cancer
as a result of his exposure to radiation while serving in the South
bombing of Nagasaki, Japan. Appellant alleged the government breached a duty to warn
Mr. Molsbergen once it became aware of the danger of his exposure. Id. at 1018. The
court reaffirmed Broudy and stated that since California law imposed a duty to warn on
a private employer, the government was under the same duty. Id. at 1024-25. See also
Cole v. United States, 755 F.2d 873 (1lth Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 765 F.2d 1123 (11th
Cir. 1985) (allowing amendment of complaint to assert post-service failure to warn claim
against the government).
76 757 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1985).
- Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, reh'g denied, 434 U.S.
882 (1977). The three factors were: (I) "the relationship between the government and
members of its armed forces is 'distinctively federal' in character"; (2) Congress has
provided a uniform system of "no fault" compensation for those injured in military
service under the Veterans Benefit Act; and (3) "the peculiar and special relationship of
the soldiers to his superiors such that tort actions between them have not been allowed."
Id. at 671.
-' Id. at 673.
" See, e.g., Fountain v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 698, 701 (W.D. Ark. 1981);
Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429, 436 (E.D. Va. 1980). See also Everett v.
United States, 492 F. Supp. 318, 321 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (The court held even suits alleging
intentional or reckless conduct would be disruptive to the soldier/superior relationship.).
10 512 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1981). After considering the Stencel three-factor test,
the court held that failure to warn the decedent of dangers posed by his exposure to
radiation was a separate tort actionable under the FTCA. Id. at 358.
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Pacific in 1946.81 He claimed that the failure of the government
to warn him of the dangers of his exposure constituted a separate
negligent act and was not barred by Feres.8 2 The district court,
however, could see no difference between the failure to warn
him initially and the failure to warn him after discharge.8 3 Kelly
contended the former constituted an intentional tort and the
latter a negligent tort. The court, however, concluded that his
claim would be the same under either theory and thus was barred
under Feres.4 The court stated:
Acceptance of Kelly's theory would lead to the kind of
problems the Supreme Court wanted to avoid in Feres. Unless
liability for post-discharge negligent omission by the govern-
ment is carefully limited to situations in which the conduct
challenged is clearly distinct from military actions immune
under Feres, military planners ... may well be inhibited in
their planning by the consideration that at some future date
they may be obligated to reveal the details of the operation
and the risks involved .... 85
In Laswell v. Brown,86 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
quoted this same passage as rationale for denying the plaintiff's
post-discharge failure to warn claim.8 7 The Laswell court also
noted that in light of the Kelly decision, the district court's
ruling in Thornwell v. United Statess was inconsistent with the
Feres rationale.89 Relying on Kelly, the court concluded that the
decision by the United States Supreme Court in Feres, tipping
, Id. at 358-59.
Id. at 358.
" Id. at 360-61.
, Id. at 361. See also Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th
Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 786 F.2d 1490, reh'g denied, 794 F.2d 687 (11th
Cir. 1986).
R' 512 F. Supp. at 361.
683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1984).
" 683 F.2d at 267. The wife and children of Laswell claimed against the Secretary
of Defense and other administration officials for his death and injuries to themselves as
a result of Laswell's exposure to radiation during nuclear weapons testing in 1946. Id.
at 262.
471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
R 683 F.2d at 267.
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the scales in favor of an unfettered military, controlled the
resolution of this issue. 90
Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Feres9l and subse-
quent reaffirmation of its validity in Stencel,92 much confusion
continues among the circuit courts concerning its application.93 The
post-service failure to warn theory of negligence is not yet a
viable alternative to the Feres bar to recovery.94 A recent Elev-
enth Circuit Court decision, 9s however, indicates a possible trend
toward recognition of this theory of negligence. In Cole v.
United States,96 the court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their
complaint to assert that the government was negligent in falling
to warn a serviceman of the hazards of radiation after military
discharge. 97 Additionally, the amended complaint asserted that
the government's knowledge concerning the hazards of radiation
after the plaintiff left the service was sufficient to give rise to a
new duty to warn. 98
This case is of particular importance because the court took
the opportunity to distinguish the factors test of Stencel. First,
the court unequivocally stated that this case would not turn on
any of the government's orders involving servicemen. "[Tihe
need to protect military discipline does not extend to dealings
between the government and veterans." 99 Second, the court found
90 Id. See also Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1980) (applied Feres
to bar a claim by parents of a serviceman who was killed on base while working for a
private construction company after his normal military duty hours).
1' 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
92 431 U.S. at 673-74.
91 See, e.g., Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1021 (1984) (claim by serviceman's child for genetic damage from exposure to
radiation was barred); Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 989 (1982) (claims by serviceman and child for injuries and birth defect due to
radiation were barred).
94 Compare Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (43 year
old attorney recovered for cancer that was caused by radioactive dye administered when
he was in the Navy) with 639 F.2d 1146 (serviceman failed to allege negligent act occurring
entirely after his discharge and could not recover for injuries caused by LSD testing).
91 Cole v. United States, 755 F.2d 873 (1lth Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 765 F.2d 1123
(11th Cir. 1985).
96 Id.
9, Id. at 880.
91 Id. at 876.
' Id. at 879.
[Vol. 75
1986-87] POST-DiscHARGE FAI.URE TO WARN
the Veterans' Benefit Act did not preclude a recovery because it
was not a dispositive factor but only one of several to consider.'00
ThirJ, nothing in the case required a hindsight judgment on the
government's orders involving Cole or any other serviceman.' 0 '
The court's analysis appears to be the best avenue available to
afford a remedy for government committed wrongs against mil-
itary personnel.
IV. CoNcLusioN
Since the Stencel ruling, some courts'0 2 have stated their
disdain for applying the Feres rationale and have asked Congress
to settle the matter. 03 Although there have been some attempts
to amend the FTCA,'1 Congress has not yet enacted a remedy'0 5
for these service personnel or their families who, but for their
military status, would have some recourse in the courts.
The United States Supreme Court is unwilling thus far to
review the post-service failure to warn theory of negligence.16 A
- Id. at 880.
WI Id. at 878.
1"2 See, e.g., Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1021 (1984); Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 989 (1982). But see Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
rev'd, 715 F.2d 96 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984) (allowing wife, son,
and estate of deceased son to recover on theory of chromosomal damages to serviceman
which in turn caused son's birth defects and wife's miscarriages and mental anguish).
See, e.g., 661 F.2d at 134 n.3.
' See Note, Malpractice Protection for Military Medical Personnel and the Feres
Doctrine: Constitutional Tension for the Military Plaintiff?, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 525, 545-
550 (1978) (passim); Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 36.
'0 Telephone Interview with Florence McGrady, House Judiciary Committee Staff
(August 23, 1985). H.R. 1338 as introduced in the House of Representatives on February
28, 1985 would allow suits against the United States resulting from atomic weapons testing
programs. H.R. 1338, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The bill is scheduled for hearings
before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Re-
lations, September 11, 12, 1985. There is no similar legislation pending in the United
States Senate.
'1 See Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 975 (1984); 711 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1272 (1984); Laswell
v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1984); 661 F.2d 129
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1984); Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d
774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
rev'd, 715 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984); In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1417 (1984).
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remedy, therefore, must come from the circuit courts. The post-
service failure to warn theory is a viable alternative to the Feres
bar to recovery and should be accepted by the courts. This
theory affords equitable relief to the military plaintiff while
avoiding encroachment on military autonomy in making com-
mand decisions and in treatment of its personnel. Finally, this
theory extends the common law maxim, that for every legal
wrong there is a remedy, to encompass claims by military plain-
tiffs.
Denise A. Garrison
